mcp-server@2.126.1
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP Server for withPICA — enables AI assistants to interact with your withPICA music catalog" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_HTTP_SECRETPICA_API_KEYPICA_CREDENTIALS_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: ADR_224_STRUCTURED_ERRORS, MCP_LAYERED_DISCOVERY, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, PICA_API_URL- Where it talks to
- withpica.com (its own)Also amazonaws.com, spotify.com, deezer.com, youtube.com, youtu.be — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names amazonaws.com, spotify.com, deezer.com, youtube.com, youtu.be as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_HTTP_SECRET, PICA_API_KEY, PICA_CREDENTIALS_PATH only into requests to withpica.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 36 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* the org an audit trail of who received what and when, and a kill switchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."'revoke the delivery from yesterday', 'kill the access to the master', " +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const YAML_UNSAFE = /[\u007F-\u009F\u2028\u2029\uFEFF\uFFFE\uFFFF]/g;Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.* distributed `npx @withpica/mcp-server` binaries can never see it. SameFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @withpica/mcp-server@2.126.1 as of 25 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.