mcp-server@2.124.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP Server for withPICA — enables AI assistants to interact with your withPICA music catalog" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_HTTP_SECRETPICA_API_KEYPICA_CREDENTIALS_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: ADR_224_STRUCTURED_ERRORS, MCP_LAYERED_DISCOVERY, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, PICA_API_URL- Where it talks to
- withpica.com (its own)Also amazonaws.com, spotify.com, deezer.com, youtube.com, youtu.be — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names amazonaws.com, spotify.com, deezer.com, youtube.com, youtu.be as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_HTTP_SECRET, PICA_API_KEY, PICA_CREDENTIALS_PATH only into requests to withpica.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* distributed `npx @withpica/mcp-server` binaries can never see it. SameFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* the org an audit trail of who received what and when, and a kill switchFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."'revoke the delivery from yesterday', 'kill the access to the master', " +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const YAML_UNSAFE = /[\u007F-\u009F\u2028\u2029\uFEFF\uFFFE\uFFFF]/g;Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @withpica/mcp-server@2.124.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.