mcp-server@2.0.149
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Velaro MCP server — connect Claude and other AI agents directly to your Velaro account: KB, workflows, bots, conversations, contacts, routing, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 76 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- velaro.com (its own)Also azurewebsites.net, mystore.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable and talks to velaro.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.0.131
vet-skills diff mcp-server 2.0.131 2.0.149In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.0.131 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
if (kind === 'npx') return `${head} Point your MCP client at "npx -y @velaro/mcp-server@latest" and restart it.`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Update notice for the self-hosted MCP server (npx @velaro/mcp-server). Once a day it asks the npm registryFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// updates itself in the background. npx cache runs only get the notice (npx reuses its cache until told otherwise).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if (kind === 'global') return `${head} Run: npm install -g @velaro/mcp-server@latest, then restart your MCP client.`;Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.// Opt out: VELARO_MCP_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1 (no check) or VELARO_NO_AUTO_UPDATE=1 (notice only, no install).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @velaro/mcp-server@2.0.149 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.