Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@2.0.131

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Velaro MCP server — connect Claude and other AI agents directly to your Velaro account: KB, workflows, bots, conversations, contacts, routing, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher velaro · publishing for 213 daysInstalls 27,313Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @velaro/mcp-server
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 65 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
velaro.com (its own)Also azurewebsites.net, mystore.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable and talks to velaro.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @velaro/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.0.123

vet-skills diff mcp-server 2.0.123 2.0.131

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.0.123 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocess8 of 65 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 5,221 lines in 70 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈76 tok
1 file · 70 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @velaro/mcp-server@2.0.131 as of 36 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.