mcp-server@1.37.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for LionChat API — 547 tools + 10 resources + 9 prompts. Audit-log aware, completion API, progress notifications." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN, YOUR_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
LIONCHAT_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: LIONCHAT_ACCOUNT_ID, LIONCHAT_BASE_URL, LIONCHAT_CATEGORIES, LIONCHAT_INCLUDE_PUBLIC_API, LIONCHAT_MCP_MAX_RESPONSE, LIONCHAT_MCP_VERSION- Where it talks to
- lionchat.com.br (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN and talks to lionchat.com.br. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN, YOUR_TOKEN); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// AIDEV-NOTE: Normalize LionChat API responses to a consistent formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."build": "tsc && npm run copy-docs && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// Tenta multiplos layouts pra cobrir build local, npm/npx e source.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// McpServer.server expoe o Server pra esses casos. Tambem anuncia capability completionsFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.// _account.json.jbuilder (topsend_api_key, liontrack_token), _user.json.jbuilder (access_token).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @lionchat/mcp-server@1.37.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.