mcp-server@1.36.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for LionChat API — 547 tools + 10 resources + 9 prompts. Audit-log aware, completion API, progress notifications." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN, YOUR_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
LIONCHAT_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: LIONCHAT_ACCOUNT_ID, LIONCHAT_BASE_URL, LIONCHAT_CATEGORIES, LIONCHAT_INCLUDE_PUBLIC_API, LIONCHAT_MCP_MAX_RESPONSE, LIONCHAT_MCP_VERSION- Where it talks to
- lionchat.com.br (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN and talks to lionchat.com.br. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for LIONCHAT_API_TOKEN, YOUR_TOKEN); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 47 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// _account.json.jbuilder (topsend_api_key, liontrack_token), _user.json.jbuilder (access_token).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."build": "tsc && npm run copy-docs && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// Tenta multiplos layouts pra cobrir build local, npm/npx e source.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// AIDEV-NOTE: Normalize LionChat API responses to a consistent formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// McpServer.server expoe o Server pra esses casos. Tambem anuncia capability completionsFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @lionchat/mcp-server@1.36.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.