Skills/npm/mantisbt-mcp-server

mantisbt-mcp-server@1.18.4

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for MantisBT REST API – read and manage bug tracker issues" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher dpesch · publishing for 244 daysInstalls 2,875Last detonated 24 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MANTIS_API_KEYMCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MANTIS_BASE_URL, MANTIS_CACHE_DIR, MANTIS_CACHE_TTL, MANTIS_DISABLE_DESTRUCTIVE, MANTIS_SEARCH_BACKEND, MANTIS_SEARCH_DIR, MANTIS_SEARCH_ENABLED, MANTIS_SEARCH_MODEL, MANTIS_SEARCH_THREADS, MANTIS_TOOLSETS, MANTIS_UPLOAD_DIR, MANTIS_USE_INDEX_PHP, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_SIZE, MCP_TEST_ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MANTIS_API_KEY, MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @dpesch/mantisbt-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 44 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
23sprocessdependency install exit 0
43sfilesystemread ~/.cache/mantisbt-mcp/unconfigured/metadata.json outside project
43sclaimed41 tools: get_issue, get_issues, list_issues, create_issue, update_issue, delete_issue, list_notes, add_note, delete_note, list_issue_files, upload_file, add_relationship, remove_relationship, add_monitor, remove_monitor, get_project, list_projects, get_project_users, get_project_versions, get_project_categories, find_project_member, create_version, update_version, release_version, delete_version
43stools2e82382dc1ece46b
43stools49c1f0da12f81bf7
43stoolsaa363a0ca41dceed
43stoolsa8bf593c1c6c5731
43stoolsf44a3dcd9f2bf19b
43stoolsd9a4130a8e6dd185
43stools1ce4d17ddf50c018
43stoolsbddf1d22a4f52265
43stoolsff3604b33782de33
43stoolsdc16786d92da152c
43stools09ffe8745d028cc5
43stoolsda5adbc58fac1697
43stools674d9e9159a61344
43stools8657e9b48f357cb6
43stools54d067e690d06d20
43stools830ddde61092674d
43stools5ad4c50b24064576
43stoolsff69209a1e9b3a3b
43stoolsaa1ed8d6e84aa3ef
43stools898deb74e382443c
43stools535d96dd265ce7b4
43stools0613181cc17ea947
43stoolsa6dd54f8b178f23f
43stools843023386f8deac2
43stoolsa9b661b8fcca0283
43stoolse521633257aa6fc9
43stoolsf78438bd67cef2b7
43stools22da4d461bd2b54a
43stoolsf192f567f3121aa6
43stoolsc8b74707fdf4d2cc
43stools32d6cc3e43838e26
43stools484aa257285da816
43stoolsc9d89683982d53c7
43stools76731c7cfb6d192e
43stools979647b8b3547123
43stoolsc5177fff619fdc8b
43stools85df9be7eb83ca8f
43stoolsc6e3a019c48a6bb7
43stoolsa6799247b04fde34
43stoolsf834bf51c0638435
43stools002a1f28a2959b3f
43sprocessscript backend runs setup only
43sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// .env.local not present — use environment variables directlyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// .env.local loaderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', '.env.local');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.js:89 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconst server = await createMcpServer('http');Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Loads .env.local at most once per process. Both getStartupConfig() andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/index.js:94 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// tools/list in parallel) would cause server.close() to kill the transport ofFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 53 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈13,391 tok
41 tools · 327 per tool
Handshake
2513 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 612

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @dpesch/mantisbt-mcp-server@1.18.4 as of 24 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dpesch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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