Skills/npm/mantisbt-mcp-server

mantisbt-mcp-server@1.18.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for MantisBT REST API – read and manage bug tracker issues" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher dpesch · publishing for 244 daysInstalls 2,875Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MANTIS_API_KEYMCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MANTIS_BASE_URL, MANTIS_CACHE_DIR, MANTIS_CACHE_TTL, MANTIS_DISABLE_DESTRUCTIVE, MANTIS_SEARCH_BACKEND, MANTIS_SEARCH_DIR, MANTIS_SEARCH_ENABLED, MANTIS_SEARCH_MODEL, MANTIS_SEARCH_THREADS, MANTIS_TOOLSETS, MANTIS_UPLOAD_DIR, MANTIS_USE_INDEX_PHP, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_TEST_ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MANTIS_API_KEY, MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @dpesch/mantisbt-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 37 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
16sprocessdependency install exit 0
36sfilesystemread ~/.cache/mantisbt-mcp/metadata.json outside project
36sclaimed41 tools: get_issue, get_issues, list_issues, create_issue, update_issue, delete_issue, list_notes, add_note, delete_note, list_issue_files, upload_file, add_relationship, remove_relationship, add_monitor, remove_monitor, get_project, list_projects, get_project_users, get_project_versions, get_project_categories, find_project_member, create_version, update_version, release_version, delete_version
36sprocessscript backend runs setup only
36sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/index.js:88 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// tools/list in parallel) would cause server.close() to kill the transport ofFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/index.js:83 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconst server = await createMcpServer('http');Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// .env.local not present — use environment variables directlyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// .env.local loaderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Loads .env.local at most once per process. Both getStartupConfig() andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', '.env.local');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 51 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈13,364 tok
41 tools · 326 per tool
Handshake
1118 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 611

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @dpesch/mantisbt-mcp-server@1.18.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dpesch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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