gc2-mcp-server@1.2.7
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "GC2 (Geo Compute Cloud) MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: API_BASE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso gc2.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gc2.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.2.5
vet-skills diff gc2-mcp-server 1.2.5 1.2.7In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.2.5 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Authorization escalation language. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
"example": "https://user:[email protected]/path/repo.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env.exampleFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… that need a bearer even for public data. Never grant the default user write or admin privileges to make a guest app "work". - In browsers use a **public** client so no secre…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log(`${postnr} ${postnrnavn}, kommune ${kommunekode}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Never commit secrets. Keep `.env.example` with placeholders.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…26-09 — **not** on production `api.gc2.io`. MCP tools ship with `@mapcentia/gc2-mcp-server` 1.1.0+ (restart the server after upgrading the spec). No `@mapcentia/gc2-sdk` class as of 0.3.0 — use the MCP tools or spec-backed HTTP. **Super-us…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.- Never commit secrets in `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…old callers keep working unchanged (same shapes and status codes), and no pgrep/kill remains. Two deliberate differences: the `cmd` field is gone from the POST respo…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/configstore/gc2-env.json.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mapcentia: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.