Skills/npm/gc2-mcp-server

gc2-mcp-server@1.2.5

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "GC2 (Geo Compute Cloud) MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mapcentia · publishing for 15 daysInstalls 1,434Last detonated 18 h ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: API_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso gc2.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gc2.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @mapcentia/gc2-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.2.4

vet-skills diff gc2-mcp-server 1.2.4 1.2.5

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.2.4 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Authorization escalation language; Access to sensitive file paths; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
5.9sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sfilesystemread ~/.config/configstore/gc2-env.json outside project
26sclaimed140 tools: postCall, postCallDry, getClient, deleteClient, patchClient, postClient, getColumn, deleteColumn, postColumn, patchColumn, postCommit, getConfiguration, deleteConfiguration, patchConfiguration, postConfiguration, getPublicConfiguration, getConstraint, deleteConstraint, postConstraint, getEvents, postEvents, getFeature, deleteFeature, patchFeature, postFeature
26stools0844beb2eedbb015
26stools0942e0c460fd2229
26stools705c5b4dcb2feae6
26stools7ae79fbe3e18fb9d
26stools75b2d7ae7cc2a4c6
26stoolsdf1d600287e83098
26stools71b5740307009a5d
26stoolsf2e43a591a5dbbe1
26stools4e97cf6b022556bb
26stools06c274df7f34951d
26stoolsf0e5792ffa1ba1ca
26stools0740f942481d704a
26stoolsc94f148c4ec53361
26stools61b35d62d1295d54
26stools232a6b1bc4587700
26stools3702114f3029c7e3
26stools5b1e58cab7211aca
26stools63306150733d715f
26stools02b844578dbb0f11
26stoolsa691c6d000523220
26stools184a5fae0f52e796
26stoolsa015e3bbe4726b47
26stoolsdcc2521b6a9eb754
26stools2a4e3e1c8c921a10
26stools034a7b8259622974
26stools5b5b1357ba0a470f
26stools517d280a9d648cfa
26stools7d3f855bdc053c29
26stoolsbf8489d7a3555aab
26stools207db08e2d3fb6f5
26stoolsbe5cbe91a3d1c3f3
26stools7faa819737bbca08
26stools961e31d29b3dd57f
26stools96a6547c8eddbc73
26stoolsb3de23edb91731ee
26stools2b721ed231771984
26stoolscc3a771dc3ac3795
26stoolsa9dd9ced47ba5eb5
26stoolscafbc460a32e2426
26stools168c63618a9317da
26stools47c0c2f386535b60
26stools92b21d25c148ab0c
26stools19bd1994e6293b3e
26stools68db2d7a0cec629f
26stools2365b353c6558224
26stools53de710ad0d40c24
26stools9ad392b25659b6d9
26stools4273a7c3c2b1522c
26stoolsfd7aafa498a3bdbc
26stools2990098edac4822d
26stoolsf1962e849554ce3a
26stools8201bce7f2065545
26stoolseb3f233e75e033d2
26stoolsf0cede8461f9d3ef
26stools65f25b0ff7086405
26stools349b5d4d2863418e
26stoolsfec0388bbd79365f
26stools9b58c0febaf947b0
26stools5854220aa9406899
26stools00e0b7ee3c700db8
26stools6b8db0b30d49d5e1
26stools8282268a8d71f8c3
26stools457b245c9fd239b6
26stoolsb92897408c6bf40f
26stools7a8e2b38a938bafd
26stoolsf6c86d11da4022a2
26stools68d04ca60d1a09bf
26stoolsb17ab0f5abe0891a
26stoolse1167f00b807217d
26stools5014f6ce977bcf96
26stoolsd85d83d55fe0d2c6
26stools6e2b21343511430d
26stools91b8db46bcdc8c03
26stools6a2eda8bac259ee7
26stools99589c70862ee032
26stoolsbf1e6c0bdc8a8c28
26stools8b515c78e1cf3bb8
26stools064223ad5a6dcbb3
26stoolse3058ce1ac4bb1b1
26stoolsd37204a0a6bef6d8
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/gc2-tile-seeding/SKILL.md:37 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…old callers keep working unchanged (same shapes and status codes), and no pgrep/kill remains. Two deliberate differences: the `cmd` field is gone from the POST respo…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageskills/gc2-auth-model/SKILL.md:49 · Authorization escalation language… that need a bearer even for public data. Never grant the default user write or admin privileges to make a guest app "work". - In browsers use a **public** client so no secret…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/gc2-auth-model/SKILL.md:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNever commit secrets. Keep `.env.example` with placeholders.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialscentia-api.json:6944 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"example": "https://user:[email protected]/path/repo.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/gc2-rules/SKILL.md:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Never commit secrets in `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/danish-search/SKILL.md:176 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`${postnr} ${postnrnavn}, kommune ${kommunekode}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)skills/gc2-scheduler/SKILL.md:12 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…26-09 — **not** on production `api.gc2.io`. MCP tools ship with `@mapcentia/gc2-mcp-server` 1.1.0+ (restart the server after upgrading the spec). No `@mapcentia/gc2-sdk` class as of 0.3.0 — use the MCP tools or spec-backed HTTP. **Super-us…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/gc2-provisioning/SKILL.md:106 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env.exampleFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈26,570 tok
24 files · 29 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈55,137 tok
140 tools · 394 per tool
Handshake
5661 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
39
description under 20 chars · avg 69

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @mapcentia/gc2-mcp-server@1.2.5 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/configstore/gc2-env.json.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mapcentia: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mapcentiaPropose a patch to the maintainer