gateway@0.42.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Suveren gateway — local agent gateway built in compliance with the Human Agency Protocol (HAP). Runs the UI, control plane, and MCP server in one Node process." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- SUVEREN_MCP_TOKEN — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SUVEREN_INTERNAL_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: HAP_BUILD_SHA, HAP_MODE, HAP_UI_DIST, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, npm_config_global, ProgramData, PROGRAMDATA, SUVEREN_AS_URL, SUVEREN_AUTOSTART, SUVEREN_BIND_HOST, SUVEREN_BUILTIN_GUIDES_DIR, SUVEREN_CA_REEXEC_DONE, SUVEREN_CP_PORT, SUVEREN_DATA_DIR, SUVEREN_GATEWAY_VERSION, SUVEREN_INSTALL_METHOD, SUVEREN_INSTALL_SETTINGS_FILE, SUVEREN_LAUNCHER, SUVEREN_MANIFESTS_DIR, SUVEREN_MCP_INTERNAL_URL, SUVEREN_MCP_PORT, SUVEREN_MCP_PUBLIC_PORT, SUVEREN_POLICY_FILE, SUVEREN_POLICY_REGISTRY, SUVEREN_POLICY_REGISTRY_KEY, SUVEREN_PROFILES_DIR, SUVEREN_SIMULATION, USERDOMAIN, USERNAME- Where it talks to
- suveren.ai (its own)Also openrouter.ai, groq.com, together.xyz, ghcr.io, apple.com, microsoft.com, nodejs.org, company.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openrouter.ai, groq.com, together.xyz, ghcr.io, apple.com, microsoft.com, nodejs.org, company.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SUVEREN_INTERNAL_SECRET only into requests to suveren.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Destructive file system command detected; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 50 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"title": "Enter your credentials below",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// npx and none of the integration shims — the gateway starts and thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.res.status(500).json({ error: "install_failed", message: output });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.The format \u2014 only these blocks, one after another. Anything else is dropped (write_report tells you how much):Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."title": "Enter your credentials below",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."title": "Enter your token below",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.message: `Your agent has no authority until you unlock it. Open ${url} and enter your API key.`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."title": "Enter your credentials below",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for (const f of manifest?.credentials?.fields ?? []) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// kill is: nothing else will reap the children.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ESRCH (group already gone) or an environment where group-killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[join(__dirname, 'dist', 'mcp-server', 'http.mjs')],Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.res.json({ ok: true, installed: true, detail: output });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.res.status(500).json({ error: "uninstall_failed", message: output });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// control-plane and MCP-server children below (those are fresh processes, soFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.res.json({ ok: true, installed: false, detail: output });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// cannot find npx or the integration bin shims, so every integration silentlyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// PATH, so npx and the integration shims go missing and every integrationFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @suveren/gateway@0.42.0 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim suveren: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.