Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 68 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 5 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/content/integrations/linkedin.json b/content/integrations/linkedin.json
--- a/content/integrations/linkedin.json
+++ b/content/integrations/linkedin.json
@@ -197,1 +197,0 @@
-"title": "Enter your credentials below",
diff --git a/content/integrations/calendar.json b/content/integrations/calendar.json
--- a/content/integrations/calendar.json
+++ b/content/integrations/calendar.json
@@ -254,1 +254,0 @@
-"title": "Enter your credentials below",
diff --git a/content/integrations/mollie.json b/content/integrations/mollie.json
--- a/content/integrations/mollie.json
+++ b/content/integrations/mollie.json
@@ -503,1 +503,0 @@
-"title": "Enter your token below",
diff --git a/dist/control-plane/index.mjs b/dist/control-plane/index.mjs
--- a/dist/control-plane/index.mjs
+++ b/dist/control-plane/index.mjs
@@ -1971,1 +1971,0 @@
-message: `Your agent has no authority until you unlock it. Open ${url} and enter your API key.`,
diff --git a/content/integrations/gmail.json b/content/integrations/gmail.json
--- a/content/integrations/gmail.json
+++ b/content/integrations/gmail.json
@@ -316,1 +316,0 @@
-"title": "Enter your credentials below",
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.42.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: gateway: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 68)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 68/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/gateway/0.42.0 ## Findings with a location - `content/integrations/linkedin.json:197` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — content/integrations/linkedin.json:197 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `content/integrations/calendar.json:254` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — content/integrations/calendar.json:254 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `content/integrations/mollie.json:503` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — content/integrations/mollie.json:503 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `dist/control-plane/index.mjs:1971` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — dist/control-plane/index.mjs:1971 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `content/integrations/gmail.json:316` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — content/integrations/gmail.json:316 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 5 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork suverenai/suveren-gateway --clone && cd suveren-gateway curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/gateway/0.42.0/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.42.0 && git commit -am "gateway: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/gateway/0.42.0/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.