foundryvtt-mcp@3.0.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for FoundryVTT integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 3.0.0
vet-skills diff foundryvtt-mcp 3.0.0 3.0.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.0.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 34 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
* The two transports are additive, not exclusive (see `.env.example`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* it was extracted, so a 2.0.0 extracted after a 2.1.0 (npx cache, a secondFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return 'the .env file of its working directory';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Claude desktop starts MCP servers in `C:\Windows\System32`; a `.env` thereFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* a `.env` file in the working directory (handy for development).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return `npx ${packageName()}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const located = { ...dotenvFile.values, ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* the `bin` name for a global install, `npx <package>` from npx's cache,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.['.env', dotenvFile.values],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return source === 'env' || source === '.env';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.case '.env':Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** Resolves the configuration again from the environment, `.env` and the file. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.export const SettingSourceSchema = z.enum(['env', '.env', 'file', 'default']);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* A direct detached child keeps the relay as its parent pid, so a tree killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* `.env` only — the file cannot say where the file is.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* development `.env`, never from the configuration file it locates.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* own environment and an optional development `.env`. Per setting, the firstFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env`, configuration file, defaults) using Zod schemas.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env` is parsed, never loaded into `process.env`: a relay hands its ownFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const file = path.join(cwd, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* 2. `.env` in the working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** Settings of the `.env` file in `cwd`; empty when there is none (or `cwd` is System32). */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.state.warning = `${file} can be read by other users and holds passwords: run \`chmod 600 ${file}\``;Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// Use realpath so the comparison works when npm/npx installs the bin as aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @g33ks/foundryvtt-mcp@3.0.1 as of 30 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/foundryvtt-mcp/config.env.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim g33ks: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.