foundryvtt-mcp@3.0.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for FoundryVTT integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.1.0
vet-skills diff foundryvtt-mcp 2.1.0 3.0.0This version reaches for something 2.1.0 did not: 2 new hosts (foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- foundryvtt.com, githubusercontent.com
2.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only. Only one of the two runs produced a tool list; tools are not compared.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
* own environment and an optional development `.env`. Per setting, the firstFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** Settings of the `.env` file in `cwd`; empty when there is none (or `cwd` is System32). */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* 2. `.env` in the working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.['.env', dotenvFile.values],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const located = { ...dotenvFile.values, ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return source === 'env' || source === '.env';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return 'the .env file of its working directory';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env` is parsed, never loaded into `process.env`: a relay hands its ownFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env`, configuration file, defaults) using Zod schemas.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* a `.env` file in the working directory (handy for development).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Claude desktop starts MCP servers in `C:\Windows\System32`; a `.env` thereFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The two transports are additive, not exclusive (see `.env.example`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env` only — the file cannot say where the file is.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const file = path.join(cwd, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.case '.env':Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Use realpath so the comparison works when npm/npx installs the bin as aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* the `bin` name for a global install, `npx <package>` from npx's cache,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* A direct detached child keeps the relay as its parent pid, so a tree killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.export const SettingSourceSchema = z.enum(['env', '.env', 'file', 'default']);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* it was extracted, so a 2.0.0 extracted after a 2.1.0 (npx cache, a secondFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* development `.env`, never from the configuration file it locates.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.state.warning = `${file} can be read by other users and holds passwords: run \`chmod 600 ${file}\``;Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts./** Resolves the configuration again from the environment, `.env` and the file. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return `npx ${packageName()}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/foundryvtt-mcp/config.env.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim g33ks: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.