cli@1.0.273
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Command line for Oya, the HIPAA-compliant agentic browser: start browsers and run playbooks from your terminal." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 1.0.233
vet-skills diff cli 1.0.233 1.0.273This version reaches for something 1.0.233 did not: 1 new credential variable (OYA_DEPLOY_DATABASE_URL). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New credential variables
- OYA_DEPLOY_DATABASE_URL
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return [{ ok: true, label: ".env exists, keeping its OYA_PROFILE_SECRET and API keys", detail: `mode ${mode}` }];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.| `oya ask "<prompt>"` | `[--id <id>]` | Drive page using configured AI model |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.`${volume} holds encrypted data from an earlier install, and there is no .env with its OYA_PROFILE_SECRET.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.note("Without it, stored cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds cannot be decrypted.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.note("Cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds in it were sealed with that");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate: (v) => v ? void 0 : "Paste the secret, or pick another option."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for (const p of playbooks) console.log(`${p.name} ${p.steps} steps ${p.variables.join(", ") || "(no inputs)"}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return `No API key for ${address}: ${why}. Pass { apiKey }, set OYA_API_KEY, or run \`npx @oya-ai/cli login --url ${address}\`.`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.secrets: "deployments/docker/.env and Docker data volumes (kept on redeploy)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const envPath = join8(root, ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const envPath = join2(root, ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if (flags.json) throw usage(`oya ${command} has no --json output. ${instead}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oya-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.