cli@1.0.233
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Command line for Oya, the HIPAA-compliant agentic browser: start browsers and run playbooks from your terminal." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
console.log(" .env updated with the pinned image digest");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.note("Without it, stored cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds cannot be decrypted.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return [{ ok: true, label: ".env exists, keeping its OYA_PROFILE_SECRET and API keys", detail: `mode ${mode}` }];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for (const p of playbooks) console.log(`${p.name} ${p.steps} steps ${p.variables.join(", ") || "(no inputs)"}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.if (flags.json) throw usage(`oya ${command} has no --json output. ${instead}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.| `oya ask "<prompt>"` | `[--id <id>]` | Drive page using configured AI model |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.const envPath = join5(root, ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate: (v) => v ? void 0 : "Paste the secret, or pick another option."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const envPath = join2(root, ".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.`${volume} holds encrypted data from an earlier install, and there is no .env with its OYA_PROFILE_SECRET.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.note("Cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds in it were sealed with that");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return `No API key for ${address}: ${why}. Pass { apiKey }, set OYA_API_KEY, or run \`npx @oya-ai/cli login --url ${address}\`.`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @oya-ai/cli@1.0.233 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oya-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.