Propose a patch

Evidence

The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.

diff --git a/dist/index.js b/dist/index.js
--- a/dist/index.js
+++ b/dist/index.js
@@ -1112,1 +1112,0 @@
-note("Cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds in it were sealed with that");
@@ -1127,1 +1126,0 @@
-validate: (v) => v ? void 0 : "Paste the secret, or pick another option."
@@ -1429,1 +1427,0 @@
-note("Without it, stored cookies, proxy credentials and TOTP seeds cannot be decrypted.");
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -86,1 +86,0 @@
-| `oya ask "<prompt>"` | `[--id <id>]`                                                                          | Drive page using configured AI model                      |

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 1.0.233. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: cli: Credential pass-through configuration (KillerSkills verdict caution 70)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 70/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

- See the findings below.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/cli/1.0.233

## Findings with a location
- `dist/index.js:1429` · Credential pass-through configuration — dist/index.js:1429 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials
- `README.md:86` · Fake instruction boundary tag — README.md:86 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file
- `dist/index.js:1127` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — dist/index.js:1127 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering
- `dist/index.js:1112` · Credential pass-through configuration — dist/index.js:1112 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._