Skills/npm/callmux

callmux@0.27.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Multiplexer for MCP tool calls — parallel execution, batching, caching, and pipelining for any MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher edimuj · publishing for 214 daysInstalls 13,104Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CALLMUX_TOKEN_ENVConfiguration, not credentials: CALLMUX_CONFIG, CALLMUX_NAMESPACE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, apple.com, brave.com, slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, apple.com, brave.com, slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CALLMUX_TOKEN_ENV only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y callmux

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
9.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
29sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-VW3y8T/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/callmux/dist/listener-client.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
29sprocessscript backend runs setup only
29sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/bin/callmux.js:1626 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify({ plan: result.plan, output: result.output }, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/cli-auth.js:125 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// pre-existing file with looser permissions keeps them unless we chmod it.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/callmux.js:286 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecallmux --cache 60 --cache-allow get_*,list_* -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:970 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst env = parseStringRecord(value.env, `servers.${serverName}.env`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/callmux.js:287 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecallmux -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/setup.js:133 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges{ value: "user", label: "User service", hint: "Recommended; no sudo required" },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/bin/callmux.js:1441 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(tool.inputSchema ?? {}, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/callmux.js:290 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecallmux server add github --tools get_issue,list_issues -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/management.js:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthrow new Error(`${field}.env must be an object`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/bin/callmux.js:1024 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(formatToolText(payload, { format: options.outputFormat }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/bin/callmux.js:288 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codecallmux --tools create_issue,search -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/upstream.js:2419 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// {"$file": "/etc/passwd"} can't make callmux read a local file and forwardFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/bin/callmux.js:1629 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(dryRun ? formatDaemonPlan(plan) : result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/upstream.js:781 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreturn candidate && typeof candidate.kill === "function" ? candidate : undefined;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/setup.js:328 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeplaceholder: "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-something",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/setup.js:174 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesp.log.info(result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/config.js:1271 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// A pre-existing temp path is impossible with wx, but chmod also protectsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for callmux@0.27.0 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim edimuj: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim edimujPropose a patch to the maintainer