callmux@0.27.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Multiplexer for MCP tool calls — parallel execution, batching, caching, and pipelining for any MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CALLMUX_TOKEN_ENVConfiguration, not credentials: CALLMUX_CONFIG, CALLMUX_NAMESPACE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, apple.com, brave.com, slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, apple.com, brave.com, slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CALLMUX_TOKEN_ENV only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
console.log(JSON.stringify({ plan: result.plan, output: result.output }, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// pre-existing file with looser permissions keeps them unless we chmod it.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.callmux --cache 60 --cache-allow get_*,list_* -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const env = parseStringRecord(value.env, `servers.${serverName}.env`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.callmux -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.{ value: "user", label: "User service", hint: "Recommended; no sudo required" },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(JSON.stringify(tool.inputSchema ?? {}, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.callmux server add github --tools get_issue,list_issues -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw new Error(`${field}.env must be an object`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log(formatToolText(payload, { format: options.outputFormat }));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.callmux --tools create_issue,search -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-githubFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// {"$file": "/etc/passwd"} can't make callmux read a local file and forwardFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.log(dryRun ? formatDaemonPlan(plan) : result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return candidate && typeof candidate.kill === "function" ? candidate : undefined;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.placeholder: "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-something",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.p.log.info(result.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// A pre-existing temp path is impossible with wx, but chmod also protectsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for callmux@0.27.0 as of 32 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim edimuj: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.