Skills/npm/atlas-loop

atlas-loop@0.1.15

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Atlas Loop —— 通用的递归学习地图 Agent Skill:把任何陌生主题拆解为独立离线的交互式 HTML 地图,并为每个节点配上深入探究与递归子图提示。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher liduchuan · publishing for 10 daysInstalls 2,725Last detonated 12 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 71 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.1.12

vet-skills diff atlas-loop 0.1.12 0.1.15

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.12 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

No longer contacted
registry.npmjs.org

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: 用法:node profile.mjs <read|record|catalog|dashboard|list> [选项]
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessexited 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/ks-detonate-4Laa7y/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/atlas-loop/template/sample-data.json'
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessexited 1: 用法:node verify_atlas.mjs --html <atlas.html 的路径>
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.8sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.8sprocess8 of 71 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandassets/hljs/lang/cos.js:1 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…break catch close continue do d|0 else elseif for goto halt hang h|0 if job j|0 kill k|0 lock l|0 merge new open quit q|0 read r|0 return set s|0 tcommit throw troll…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:107 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesnode <skill_dir>/scripts/build_atlas.mjs --data /tmp/atlas-loop-<ts>/graph-data.json --out <output_html>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbin/atlas-loop.mjs:26 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesnpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop build --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/atlas-loop.mjs:24 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop install [--dir <skills-dir>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedassets/hljs/lang/1c.js:1 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…410-\u042F\u0430-\u044F\u0451\u0401_0-9]+",_="\u0434\u0430\u043B\u0435\u0435 "+"\u0432\u043E\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0442 \u0432\u044B\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044C\u0438\u0441\u043A\u043B\u044E\u0447\…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/atlas-loop.mjs:27 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop verify --html <output.html>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/atlas-loop.mjs:25 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop dev [--port 5179] [--data <graph-data.json>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedassets/hljs/lang/isbl.js:1 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…"and \u0438 else \u0438\u043D\u0430\u0447\u0435 endexcept endfinally endforeach \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0435\u0446\u0432\u0441\u0435 endif \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0435\u0446\u0435\u0441\u043B\u0438 endwhile \u043A\u0…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstemplate/dev-server.mjs:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn fs.readFileSync(tmpOut, 'utf8').replace(/import\.meta\.env/g, '({MODE:"development"})');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/build_atlas.mjs:435 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.error('用法:node build_atlas.mjs --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstemplate/dev-server.mjs:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn res.outputFiles[0].text.replace(/import\.meta\.env/g, '({MODE:"development"})');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/atlas-loop.mjs:28 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop link --parent <parent.html> --child <child.html> (--node <id|title> | --stream <id|title>)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/atlas-loop.mjs:26 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @liduchuan/atlas-loop build --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,147 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim liduchuan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim liduchuanPropose a patch to the maintainer