atlas-loop@0.1.12
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Atlas Loop —— 通用的递归学习地图 Agent Skill:把任何陌生主题拆解为独立离线的交互式 HTML 地图,并为每个节点配上深入探究与递归子图提示。" Observed in sandbox: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 72 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.1.10
vet-skills diff atlas-loop 0.1.10 0.1.12In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.10 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 10 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
npx @liduchuan/atlas-loop install [--dir <skills-dir>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…break catch close continue do d|0 else elseif for goto halt hang h|0 if job j|0 kill k|0 lock l|0 merge new open quit q|0 read r|0 return set s|0 tcommit throw troll…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.node <skill_dir>/scripts/build_atlas.mjs --data /tmp/atlas-loop-<ts>/graph-data.json --out <output_html>Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…"and \u0438 else \u0438\u043D\u0430\u0447\u0435 endexcept endfinally endforeach \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0435\u0446\u0432\u0441\u0435 endif \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0435\u0446\u0435\u0441\u043B\u0438 endwhile \u043A\u0…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.…410-\u042F\u0430-\u044F\u0451\u0401_0-9]+",_="\u0434\u0430\u043B\u0435\u0435 "+"\u0432\u043E\u0437\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0442 \u0432\u044B\u0437\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044C\u0438\u0441\u043A\u043B\u044E\u0447\…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.return res.outputFiles[0].text.replace(/import\.meta\.env/g, '({MODE:"development"})');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx @liduchuan/atlas-loop build --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return fs.readFileSync(tmpOut, 'utf8').replace(/import\.meta\.env/g, '({MODE:"development"})');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx @liduchuan/atlas-loop dev [--port 5179] [--data <graph-data.json>]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @liduchuan/atlas-loop verify --html <output.html>Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.error('用法:node build_atlas.mjs --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx @liduchuan/atlas-loop build --data <graph-data.json> [--out <output.html>]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @liduchuan/atlas-loop@0.1.12 as of 11 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim liduchuan: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.