action1-mcp-server@0.6.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Unofficial Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Action1 RMM REST API: curated and generated tools over the Action1 OpenAPI spec, a destructive-operation guard, stdio and Streamable HTTP transports, and an MCPB bundle. Not affiliated with Action1." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACTION1_CLIENT_SECRETACTION1_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MSMCP_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTHMCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ACTION1_ALLOW_ACCOUNT_OPS, ACTION1_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE, ACTION1_ALLOW_ENTERPRISE_OPS, ACTION1_ALLOWED_ORG_IDS, ACTION1_BASE_URL, ACTION1_CLIENT_ID, ACTION1_DEFAULT_RETRY_MINUTES, ACTION1_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MINUTES, ACTION1_DESTRUCTIVE_AUTO_CONFIRM, ACTION1_LAST_SEEN_STALE_MINUTES, ACTION1_LOG_LEVEL, ACTION1_ORG_ID, ACTION1_REDACT_PII, ACTION1_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, ACTION1_TOOLSETS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TRUST_PROXY, VITEST- Where it talks to
- action1.com (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACTION1_CLIENT_SECRET, ACTION1_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTH, MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to action1.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 34 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* `.env.example` to the same key set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const CONFIG_HINT = "See .env.example for the required keys; empty values count as unset.";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.lines.push("", "Empty values count as unset. See .env.example and docs/SECURITY.md for details.", "");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* copied `.env.example`) to "", and an empty value must mean "use theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// `timefrom` / `timeto` query parameters, last_seen, ...) in the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."inspector": "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] node --env-file=.env dist/index.js",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `.env.example` to the same key set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const trimmed = inner.replace(/^[\s ]+/, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."inspector": "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] node --env-file=.env dist/index.js",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// URL-embedded basic-auth credentials (https://user:password@host).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const ZWSP = "";Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.// after the first `<<` breaks the verbatim token (`<<<USER INPUTFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for action1-mcp-server@0.6.2 as of 14 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mguttmann: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.