Skills/npm/action1-mcp-server

action1-mcp-server@0.6.2

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Unofficial Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Action1 RMM REST API: curated and generated tools over the Action1 OpenAPI spec, a destructive-operation guard, stdio and Streamable HTTP transports, and an MCPB bundle. Not affiliated with Action1." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mguttmann · publishing for 24 daysInstalls 7,960Last detonated 14 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACTION1_CLIENT_SECRETACTION1_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MSMCP_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTHMCP_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ACTION1_ALLOW_ACCOUNT_OPS, ACTION1_ALLOW_DESTRUCTIVE, ACTION1_ALLOW_ENTERPRISE_OPS, ACTION1_ALLOWED_ORG_IDS, ACTION1_BASE_URL, ACTION1_CLIENT_ID, ACTION1_DEFAULT_RETRY_MINUTES, ACTION1_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MINUTES, ACTION1_DESTRUCTIVE_AUTO_CONFIRM, ACTION1_LAST_SEEN_STALE_MINUTES, ACTION1_LOG_LEVEL, ACTION1_ORG_ID, ACTION1_REDACT_PII, ACTION1_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, ACTION1_TOOLSETS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TRUST_PROXY, VITEST
Where it talks to
action1.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACTION1_CLIENT_SECRET, ACTION1_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTH, MCP_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to action1.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets ACTION1_CLIENT_SECRET=action1.com,ACTION1_TOKEN_TIMEOUT_MS=action1.com,MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_NO_AUTH=action1.com,MCP_HTTP_TOKEN=action1.com -- npx -y action1-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 34 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
14sprocessdependency install exit 0
34sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-sVU2PT/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/action1-mcp-server/dist/client/action1Client.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
34sprocessscript backend runs setup only
34sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.d.ts:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `.env.example` to the same key set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:306 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst CONFIG_HINT = "See .env.example for the required keys; empty values count as unset.";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslines.push("", "Empty values count as unset. See .env.example and docs/SECURITY.md for details.", "");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:333 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* copied `.env.example`) to "", and an empty value must mean "use theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddist/spec/time.js:4 · Destructive file system command detected// `timefrom` / `timeto` query parameters, last_seen, ...) in the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"inspector": "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] node --env-file=.env dist/index.js",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:211 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `.env.example` to the same key set.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detecteddist/utils/csv.js:36 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentconst trimmed = inner.replace(/^[\s ​‎‏]+/, "");Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:58 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"inspector": "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected] node --env-file=.env dist/index.js",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsdist/utils/logger.js:45 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking// URL-embedded basic-auth credentials (https://user:password@host).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detecteddist/prompts/index.js:41 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentconst ZWSP = "​";Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detecteddist/prompts/index.js:54 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content// after the first `<<` breaks the verbatim token (`<<​<USER INPUTFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈102 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for action1-mcp-server@0.6.2 as of 14 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mguttmann: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mguttmannPropose a patch to the maintainer