Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 73 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 4 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/dist/utils/csv.js b/dist/utils/csv.js --- a/dist/utils/csv.js +++ b/dist/utils/csv.js @@ -36,1 +36,0 @@ -const trimmed = inner.replace(/^[\s ]+/, ""); diff --git a/dist/utils/logger.js b/dist/utils/logger.js --- a/dist/utils/logger.js +++ b/dist/utils/logger.js @@ -45,1 +45,0 @@ -// URL-embedded basic-auth credentials (https://user:password@host). diff --git a/dist/prompts/index.js b/dist/prompts/index.js --- a/dist/prompts/index.js +++ b/dist/prompts/index.js @@ -41,1 +41,0 @@ -const ZWSP = ""; @@ -54,1 +53,0 @@ -// after the first `<<` breaks the verbatim token (`<<<USER INPUT
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.6.2. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: action1-mcp-server: Hidden zero-width characters detected (KillerSkills verdict caution 73)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **CAUTION 73/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/action1-mcp-server/0.6.2 ## Findings with a location - `dist/utils/csv.js:36` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — dist/utils/csv.js:36 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content - `dist/utils/logger.js:45` · URL with embedded credentials — dist/utils/logger.js:45 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `dist/prompts/index.js:41` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — dist/prompts/index.js:41 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content - `dist/prompts/index.js:54` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — dist/prompts/index.js:54 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork mguttmann/action1-mcp --clone && cd action1-mcp curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/action1-mcp-server/0.6.2/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.6.2 && git commit -am "action1-mcp-server: Hidden zero-width characters detected" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/npm/action1-mcp-server/0.6.2/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.