Skills/Glama/tallyqueue

tallyqueue@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI clients to add receipts and invoices with extracted facts and proposed bookkeeping entries, list and update pending items, and retrieve the user's account list over MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher gothenburgoffice · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TALLYQUEUE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DATA_DIR, MAX_RECEIPT_BYTES, PUBLIC_URL, RIKSBANK_LOOKUP, SOURCE_URL, TALLYQUEUE_RELOAD, TALLYQUEUE_USERS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso riksbank.se — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names riksbank.se as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TALLYQUEUE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is tallyqueue@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/renew-constraints.sh: line 12: docker: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'anyio'
0.7sprocess8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtallyqueue/model.py:376 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentline = line.strip().lstrip('')Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.dev.yaml:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# live here, so a dev stack never uses the real values in .env or the real data volume.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.caddy.yaml:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSITE_ADDRESS: ${SITE_ADDRESS:-${PUBLIC_URL:?Set PUBLIC_URL in .env}}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_model.py:245 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content'#FLAGGA 0\n'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:273 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:37 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& mkdir -p /data && chown app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:32 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Collects secret-named environment variables and sends data outtests/test_server.py:272 · Collects secret-named environment variables and sends data outenv = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != 'TALLYQUEUE_USERS'}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionstallyqueue/templates/item.html:197 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file<summary>Delete this item</summary> <form method="post" action="/items/{{ item.id }}/delete" class="stack"> <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="{{ session.cFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:414 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsassert fetch('POST', '/upload', b'MZ\x90\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00', {'X-API-Key': ALICE})[0] == 400Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,106 tok
3 files · 44 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim gothenburgoffice: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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