Skills/Glama/populi-mcp

populi-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to search and describe API routes, retrieve people, admissions, academics, and billing records, download exports, and optionally make changes against a school information system, read-only by default." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kisasa · publishing for 8 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
POPULI_API_KEYPOPULI_MCP_PREVIOUS_SECRETSPOPULI_MCP_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES, POPULI_ALLOWED_HOSTS, POPULI_ALLOWED_REDIRECTS, POPULI_BASE_URL, POPULI_FILES_DIR, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, POPULI_MCP_TRANSPORT, POPULI_TIMEOUT_MS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso populiweb.com, populi.co, claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names populiweb.com, populi.co, claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects POPULI_API_KEY, POPULI_MCP_PREVIOUS_SECRETS, POPULI_MCP_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/lib/config.ts:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* is never trusted outside it, so a prompt-injected "upload ~/.ssh/id_rsa" has nothing to read.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/config.test.ts:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_API_KEY: "sk_sandbox_abc" }).sandbox).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hosted.test.ts:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/files.test.ts:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files["../../etc/passwd", "passwd"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/config.test.ts:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES: v }).allowWrites).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/files.test.ts:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait expect(readUpload(tempDir(), { path: "../../etc/passwd" })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PopuliError);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstest/hosted.test.ts:182 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"http://localhost:[email protected]/cb",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDdata/catalog.json:1 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware…ject.","roles":[],"params":[],"actionParams":[],"expand":[],"filters":[],"doc":"https://populi.co/api/models/customerbackups.html#show"},{"id":"customerbackups.download","model":"customerbackups","op":"download","title":"Backup","method":"…Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/lib/config.ts:14 · References a credential file in the home directory* is never trusted outside it, so a prompt-injected "upload ~/.ssh/id_rsa" has nothing to read.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/config.test.ts:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_FILES_DIR: join(homedir(), "elsewhere") }).filesDir).toBe(join(homedir(), "elsewhere"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/config.test.ts:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_FILES_DIR: " " }).filesDir).toBe(join(homedir(), "populi-mcp-files"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/hosted/config.ts:97 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking* rule, and it may not carry credentials. `http://localhost:[email protected]/` fails because its host is evil.com.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hosted.test.ts:232 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(() => loadHostedConfig({ ...env, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL: "http://mcp.example.edu" })).toThrow(ConfigError);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/files.test.ts:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesit.each(["../outside.txt", "sub/../../outside.txt", "/etc/passwd", "C:\\Windows\\win.ini", "..", "."])(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/config.test.ts:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES: v }).allowWrites).toBe(false);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:174 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file…nect** and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hosted.test.ts:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexpect(loadHostedConfig({ ...env, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL: "http://localhost:8080" }).publicUrl).toBe("http://localhost:8080");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/server.test.ts:323 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor (const path of ["../secret.txt", "/etc/passwd", "C:\\Windows\\win.ini"]) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:174 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file…and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Unpinned dependency.github/workflows/publish.yml:40 · Unpinned dependencyrun: npm install -g npm@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:174 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file…and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/hosted.test.ts:487 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarguments: { method: "POST", path: "/people/1/upload_file", files: [{ path: "/etc/passwd" }] },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kisasa: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kisasaPropose a patch to the maintainer