populi-mcp@0.4.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to search and describe API routes, retrieve people, admissions, academics, and billing records, download exports, and optionally make changes against a school information system, read-only by default." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
POPULI_API_KEYPOPULI_MCP_PREVIOUS_SECRETSPOPULI_MCP_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES, POPULI_ALLOWED_HOSTS, POPULI_ALLOWED_REDIRECTS, POPULI_BASE_URL, POPULI_FILES_DIR, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, POPULI_MCP_TRANSPORT, POPULI_TIMEOUT_MS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso populiweb.com, populi.co, claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names populiweb.com, populi.co, claude.ai, claude.com, chatgpt.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects POPULI_API_KEY, POPULI_MCP_PREVIOUS_SECRETS, POPULI_MCP_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* is never trusted outside it, so a prompt-injected "upload ~/.ssh/id_rsa" has nothing to read.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_API_KEY: "sk_sandbox_abc" }).sandbox).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose....env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.["../../etc/passwd", "passwd"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES: v }).allowWrites).toBe(true);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.await expect(readUpload(tempDir(), { path: "../../etc/passwd" })).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(PopuliError);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."http://localhost:[email protected]/cb",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…ject.","roles":[],"params":[],"actionParams":[],"expand":[],"filters":[],"doc":"https://populi.co/api/models/customerbackups.html#show"},{"id":"customerbackups.download","model":"customerbackups","op":"download","title":"Backup","method":"…Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.* is never trusted outside it, so a prompt-injected "upload ~/.ssh/id_rsa" has nothing to read.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_FILES_DIR: join(homedir(), "elsewhere") }).filesDir).toBe(join(homedir(), "elsewhere"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_FILES_DIR: " " }).filesDir).toBe(join(homedir(), "populi-mcp-files"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* rule, and it may not carry credentials. `http://localhost:[email protected]/` fails because its host is evil.com.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(() => loadHostedConfig({ ...env, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL: "http://mcp.example.edu" })).toThrow(ConfigError);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.it.each(["../outside.txt", "sub/../../outside.txt", "/etc/passwd", "C:\\Windows\\win.ini", "..", "."])(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.expect(loadConfig({ ...env, POPULI_ALLOW_WRITES: v }).allowWrites).toBe(false);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…nect** and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.expect(loadHostedConfig({ ...env, POPULI_MCP_PUBLIC_URL: "http://localhost:8080" }).publicUrl).toBe("http://localhost:8080");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for (const path of ["../secret.txt", "/etc/passwd", "C:\\Windows\\win.ini"]) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.run: npm install -g npm@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.…and signs in themselves. - **ChatGPT**: Settings > Connectors (or Apps), enable developer mode if your workspace requires it, create a connector with the same URL, and choose…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.arguments: { method: "POST", path: "/people/1/upload_file", files: [{ path: "/etc/passwd" }] },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kisasa: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.