lumen@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables interactive sprite operations, inspection, palettes, text, style presets, dream-animation automation, QA gates, and export backends such as PNG sheets, WASM-4, TIC-80, and VoidSprite file interop, with all paths project-root bounded." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso vrm.dev, huggingface.co, nip.io, evil.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is lumen@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
r#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.//! an optional `.lumen.json` output (`None` = save in place).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.kill -KILL -- "-${app_pgid}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# setsid: the app tree gets its own process group, so cleanup can killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell..env("CUDA_DEVICE_ORDER", "PCI_BUS_ID")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env("CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES", &engine.cuda_visible_devices)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose..env("CUDA_DEVICE_ORDER", &engine.cuda_device_order)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill -TERM -- "-${app_pgid}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out./// Header probe, read before full validation so a wrong formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if ! kill -0 "$app_pgid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.let value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.r#"{"endpoint":"http://10.0.0.7:15702"}"#,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.let value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.let value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// `.lumen.json`), else back over the input document.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.//! an optional `.lumen.json` output path (`None` = save in place).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.let resp = match client.post(url).json(&body).send().await {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.//! metadata ending in `.json`, document outputs ending in `.lumen.json`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.r#"{"endpoint":"http://192.168.1.20:15702"}"#,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.let value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.r#"{"doc":"sprites/hero.lumen.json","output":"out/hero.png"}"#,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why./// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.self.log.event("info", "source_uploaded", json!({"job_id": job_id,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim qompassai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.