lumen@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables interactive sprite operations, inspection, palettes, text, style presets, dream-animation automation, QA gates, and export backends such as PNG sheets, WASM-4, TIC-80, and VoidSprite file interop, with all paths project-root bounded." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher qompassai · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso vrm.dev, huggingface.co, nip.io, evil.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is lumen@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 1: interop_check: FAIL: required tool not found: cargo
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'PIL'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'bpy'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'PIL'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'bpy'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'bpy'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: patch_scripts: lumen_base_mesh.py not found (looked at /tmp/ks-detonate-0zhCfX/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/lumen/scripts/lumen_base_mesh.py); set LUMEN_BASE_MESH to its path
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 2: files (the ship pipe's double-bake checks this).
0.3sprocess8 of 14 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/policy.rs:1268 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/dream.rs:18 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files//! an optional `.lumen.json` output (`None` = save in place).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/interop_check.sh:59 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -KILL -- "-${app_pgid}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/interop_check.sh:102 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# setsid: the app tree gets its own process group, so cleanup can killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/generation/lifecycle.rs:95 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("CUDA_DEVICE_ORDER", "PCI_BUS_ID")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/generation/lifecycle.rs:134 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES", &engine.cuda_visible_devices)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorysrc/policy.rs:1268 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryr#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/generation/lifecycle.rs:133 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env("CUDA_DEVICE_ORDER", &engine.cuda_device_order)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/interop_check.sh:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM -- "-${app_pgid}" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/policy.rs:1268 · References a credential file in the home directoryr#"{"cmd":"cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}"#,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/pipes/sweep_variants.py:101 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcrates/lumen-rig-core/src/raw.rs:11 · Destructive file system command detected/// Header probe, read before full validation so a wrong formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/interop_check.sh:111 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 "$app_pgid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/qa.rs:85 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/palette.rs:158 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/hf_upload.rs:1289 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/palette.rs:123 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Output `.lumen.json`; `None` saves over the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/policy.rs:1201 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetr#"{"endpoint":"http://10.0.0.7:15702"}"#,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/hf_upload.rs:869 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/style.rs:79 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/dream.rs:78 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/hf_upload.rs:1059 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/hf_upload.rs:895 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesresp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/dream.rs:125 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sprite_ops.rs:1205 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// `.lumen.json`), else back over the input document.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/style.rs:16 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files//! an optional `.lumen.json` output path (`None` = save in place).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/lib.rs:382 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet resp = match client.post(url).json(&body).send().await {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/export.rs:9 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files//! metadata ending in `.json`, document outputs ending in `.lumen.json`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/style.rs:46 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/policy.rs:1015 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetr#"{"endpoint":"http://192.168.1.20:15702"}"#,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/hf_upload.rs:1136 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileslet value: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| HfUploadError::Api {Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/dream.rs:95 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/policy.rs:1078 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesr#"{"doc":"sprites/hero.lumen.json","output":"out/hero.png"}"#,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/dream.rs:108 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/// Project-relative output `.lumen.json`; omit to overwrite the input.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/generation/service.rs:959 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesself.log.event("info", "source_uploaded", json!({"job_id": job_id,Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim qompassai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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