Skills/Glama/krusch-grounded-harness

krusch-grounded-harness@0.2.1

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI coding and data agents to compile turn-0 workspace schemas and hazard flags, block duplicate-call spin loops, and gate outputs for objective defects while running fully locally with zero cloud calls." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kruschdev · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OLLAMA_HOST, OLLAMA_MODEL, OLLAMA_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GEMINI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
9.9sprocessdependency install exit 0
30sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · Options: -j, --json -h, --help -v, --version
30sprocessscript backend runs setup only
30sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:60 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `config.json` & `.env.example` — Default port (`3782`), service name, `DB_PATH`, `DATA_DIR`, and `LOG_DIR`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'cat .env' }, alwaysForbidden: true }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/grounded-harness.test.js:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.equal(schema.fileCount, 5); // orders.csv, tiers.json, ledger.sqlite, pricing.js, policy.md (.env skipped!)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:254 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// blocks non-`path` credential-store escapes (`credential_source: '/etc/shadow'`)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/auth-drift-guard.js:168 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/\b(?:dict\s*\(\s*os\.environ\s*\)|os\.environ\.copy\s*\(\s*\)|JSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*process\.env\b)/;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/trace-rule-synthesizer.test.js:126 · Destructive file system command detected// `rm -rf /` hits frozen policy floor first or tracked source delete false-positiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:267 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesargs: { credential_source: '/etc/shadow' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/grounded-harness.test.js:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.ok(!Object.keys(schema.fileDigests).some((f) => f.includes('.env')));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/grounding-compiler.js:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn name === '.env' || name.startsWith('.env.') || name === '.DS_Store' || SQLITE_SIDECAR_RE.test(name);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:253 · References a credential file in the home directory// Layer 1 (policyFloor) blocks `~/.ssh/id_rsa` on `path`, while Layer 2 (authDriftGuard)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/grounded-harness.test.js:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, '.env'), 'SECRET_API_KEY=should_never_be_indexed\n', 'utf8');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:259 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesargs: { path: '~/.ssh/id_rsa' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:259 · References a credential file in the home directoryargs: { path: '~/.ssh/id_rsa' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/trace-rule-synthesizer.js:60 · Destructive file system command detected{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/grounded-harness.test.js:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Secret .env file must be ignored by workspace grounderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:202 · Destructive file system command detected// 1. Policy floor CANNOT be bypassed by wrapping `rm -rf /` inside markdown shell fencesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/grounded-harness.test.js:407 · Destructive file system command detectedargs: { command: 'rm -rf /' }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/grounded-harness.test.js:407 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceargs: { command: 'rm -rf /' }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/auth-drift-guard.test.js:253 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Layer 1 (policyFloor) blocks `~/.ssh/id_rsa` on `path`, while Layer 2 (authDriftGuard)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,370 tok
2 files · 30 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kruschdev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kruschdevPropose a patch to the maintainer