krusch-grounded-harness@0.2.1
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI coding and data agents to compile turn-0 workspace schemas and hazard flags, block duplicate-call spin loops, and gate outputs for objective defects while running fully locally with zero cloud calls." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OLLAMA_HOST, OLLAMA_MODEL, OLLAMA_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for GEMINI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- `config.json` & `.env.example` — Default port (`3782`), service name, `DB_PATH`, `DATA_DIR`, and `LOG_DIR`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'cat .env' }, alwaysForbidden: true }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert.equal(schema.fileCount, 5); // orders.csv, tiers.json, ledger.sqlite, pricing.js, policy.md (.env skipped!)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// blocks non-`path` credential-store escapes (`credential_source: '/etc/shadow'`)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./\b(?:dict\s*\(\s*os\.environ\s*\)|os\.environ\.copy\s*\(\s*\)|JSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*process\.env\b)/;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// `rm -rf /` hits frozen policy floor first or tracked source delete false-positiveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.args: { credential_source: '/etc/shadow' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert.ok(!Object.keys(schema.fileDigests).some((f) => f.includes('.env')));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return name === '.env' || name.startsWith('.env.') || name === '.DS_Store' || SQLITE_SIDECAR_RE.test(name);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Layer 1 (policyFloor) blocks `~/.ssh/id_rsa` on `path`, while Layer 2 (authDriftGuard)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.fs.writeFileSync(path.join(dir, '.env'), 'SECRET_API_KEY=should_never_be_indexed\n', 'utf8');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.args: { path: '~/.ssh/id_rsa' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.args: { path: '~/.ssh/id_rsa' }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ tool: 'bash', args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }, alwaysForbidden: true },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Secret .env file must be ignored by workspace grounderFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// 1. Policy floor CANNOT be bypassed by wrapping `rm -rf /` inside markdown shell fencesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.args: { command: 'rm -rf /' }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Layer 1 (policyFloor) blocks `~/.ssh/id_rsa` on `path`, while Layer 2 (authDriftGuard)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kruschdev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.