Skills/Glama/keenetic-mcp

keenetic-mcp@0.0.0-dev

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Lets AI agents control a Keenetic router over the local network through the Model Context Protocol, managing devices, Wi-Fi, port forwarding, KeenDNS, DNS, DHCP, firewall, mesh, storage, logs and diagnostics with a safe, read-back-verified change model. An opt-in SSH mode additionally enables Entware package management and config file editing on the router." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ml-senior · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
KEENETIC_TEST_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: KEENETIC_MCP_VERSION, KEENETIC_TEST_HOST, KEENETIC_TEST_USER, KEENETIC_TOOLS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for KEENETIC_TEST_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/index.ts:124 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* as a symlink in node_modules/.bin, so under `npx keenetic-mcp` argv[1] is theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/router/backup.test.ts:67 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringconst guard = createBackupGuard(rciReturning(CONFIG), 'http://192.0.2.1:8080', CLOCK);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/version.ts:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst file = fileURLToPath(new URL('.env', ROOT));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/cli/init.ts:90 · References a credential file in the home directoryconst keyPath = expandHome((await deps.prompt('Private key path', '~/.ssh/id_ed25519')) || '~/.ssh/id_ed25519');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/binary.test.ts:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Pinned empty rather than left out. The server reads a .env from theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/ci.yml:38 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# every `npx keenetic-mcp` invocation reaches it.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli/init.ts:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst keyPath = expandHome((await deps.prompt('Private key path', '~/.ssh/id_ed25519')) || '~/.ssh/id_ed25519');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/router/backup.test.ts:67 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameconst guard = createBackupGuard(rciReturning(CONFIG), 'http://192.0.2.1:8080', CLOCK);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/binary.test.ts:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// this keeps a developer's own .env from deciding what the version testFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/version.ts:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* installed copy lives in node_modules and has no `.env` there, so this is aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetests/binary.test.ts:128 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeit('answers initialize when run through a symlink, the way npx does', async () => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/version.ts:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* Loads a `.env` sitting next to package.json, if there is one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/ci.yml:39 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- name: Install the packed tarball and run it through npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:1 · Image alt text carrying instructionskeenetic-mcp, the Keenetic MCP server: secure automation and control for Keenetic routers via the Model Context Protocol. Your AI client talks to the MCP serverFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetests/binary.test.ts:126 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// npx the entry path is the link and the module path is its target. VersionFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// credentials in .env instead of exporting them. A no-op once installed.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/tools/ssh.test.ts:111 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device['rm -rf /', 'filesystem root'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/ssh.test.ts:152 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesit.each([['/etc/../etc/passwd'], ["'quoted'"], ['relative/path']])(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/tools/ssh.test.ts:225 · Destructive file system command detectedpackage: 'nano; rm -rf /opt'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/tools/ssh.test.ts:112 · Destructive file system command detected['rm -rf /opt', 'Entware'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/tools/ssh.test.ts:111 · Destructive file system command detected['rm -rf /', 'filesystem root'],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/config/discover.test.ts:141 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetexpect(sshHost('http://192.168.1.1:8080/')).toBe('192.168.1.1');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
Unpinned dependency.github/workflows/release.yml:27 · Unpinned dependency- run: npm install -g npm@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/ssh.test.ts:195 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesit.each([['/etc/passwd'], ['/opt/../etc/x'], ['/home/user/x']])(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,068 tok
4 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ml-senior: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ml-seniorPropose a patch to the maintainer