google-mail@0.1.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables read-only email operations through MCP tools, returning capped results with release metadata." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENor--garbage-token- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, googleusercontent.com, creativecommons.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, googleusercontent.com, creativecommons.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GITHUB_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Image alt text carrying instructions; Image alt text carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Reference: ``docs/upstream/discovery.json``, ``resources.users.resources.messages.methods.send``:Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Your application sends a token request to the Google Authorization Server, receives an authorization code, exchanges the code for a token, and uses the token toFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.run = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "ruff", *command, str(ENUMS)], cwd=ROOT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.calls as ``ok_2.json`` and ``ok_3.json``. The task's client is the recorder's: it is putFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Your JS application sends a token request to the Google Authorization Server, receives a token, validates the token, and uses the token to call a Google API endFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."Read(**/.envrc)", "Read(**/.env)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Your server application uses a JWT to request a token from the Google Authorization Server, then uses the token to call a Google API endpoint. No end-user is inFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Your application sends a token request to the Google Authorization Server, receives an authorization code, exchanges the code for a token, and uses the token toFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim xippios: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.