flow-behind@1.0.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to generate Google Flow images and videos, check connection status, list jobs, and retrieve job results through a local browser bridge." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso nodejs.org, workers.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
else console.log(`merged ${r.inputs} clips (${r.method}) \u2192 ${r.output}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const how = process.platform === "win32" ? "winget install Gyan.FFmpeg" : process.platform === "darwin" ? "brew install ffmpeg" : "sudo apt install ffmpeg (or your distribution's equivalent)";Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Needs ffmpeg on PATH — `winget install Gyan.FFmpeg` (Windows), `brew install ffmpeg` (macOS), `sudo apt install ffmpeg` (Linux) — or set `FFMPEG_PATH`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.else console.log(`${r.mode}: ${r.detail} \u2192 ${r.output}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.**`stop` is the kill switch — reach for it.** A batch that is going wrong keepsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y ffmpegFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`npx hyperframes@latest`. So do NOT assume it is present and do NOT install itFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.log(`[bridge] ${msg.site}: keeping ${state.browser}, ${msg.browser ?? "?"} put on standby`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const how = platform === "win32" ? "winget install Gyan.FFmpeg" : platform === "darwin" ? "brew install ffmpeg" : "sudo apt install ffmpeg (or your distribution's equivalent)";Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env: { ...process.env, FLOW_BEHIND_HOME: home, FLOW_BEHIND_NO_UPDATE_CHECK: '1', FLOW_AUTO_NO_UPDATE_CHECK: '1', ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim behindofficial: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.