Skills/Glama/facteur

facteur@1.0.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients like Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor to search, read, organize and send Proton Mail through Proton Mail Bridge, plus look up Proton Pass items and read Proton Calendar events. Supports built-in OAuth with per-connection scopes, so each app gets only read, organize/draft or send permissions." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher cempack · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 46/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/http/connections.ts:110 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/mail/message.ts:126 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/http/pages.ts:217 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp/server.ts:22 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:15 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressDockerfile:61 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/http/app.ts:26 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/http/pages.ts:218 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/mail/message.ts:135 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/http/pages.ts:219 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:42 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/http/pages.ts:220 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:39 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/pass/service.ts:91 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:23 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressDockerfile:61 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http/app.ts:317 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:56 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/pass/service.ts:110 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 49 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

34 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cempack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cempackPropose a patch to the maintainer