← facteur@1.0.0

Propose a patch

A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 46 · Caution

Evidence

The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.

Diff · removes 4 caught lines

Download .patch
diff --git a/src/mail/message.ts b/src/mail/message.ts
--- a/src/mail/message.ts
+++ b/src/mail/message.ts
@@ -126,1 +126,0 @@
-.replace(/[​-‍⁠͏­]+/g, "") // invisible preheader padding
@@ -135,1 +134,0 @@
-.replace(/[​-‍⁠͏­]+/g, "")
diff --git a/src/mcp/server.ts b/src/mcp/server.ts
--- a/src/mcp/server.ts
+++ b/src/mcp/server.ts
@@ -22,1 +22,0 @@
-ctx.pass && ctx.scopes.has(SCOPES.passReveal) && "read Pass secrets",
diff --git a/src/http/app.ts b/src/http/app.ts
--- a/src/http/app.ts
+++ b/src/http/app.ts
@@ -26,1 +26,0 @@
-// the static token can't read Pass secrets unless FACTEUR_API_TOKEN_SCOPES says so

Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 1.0.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.

Issue / PR body

Title: facteur: Hidden zero-width characters detected (KillerSkills verdict caution 46)

## What the honeypot observed
KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.7) and scored it **CAUTION 46/100**. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

- See the findings below.

Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/facteur/1.0.0

## Findings with a location
- `src/mail/message.ts:126` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — src/mail/message.ts:126 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content
- `src/mcp/server.ts:22` · Credential pass-through configuration — src/mcp/server.ts:22 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials
- `src/http/app.ts:26` · Credential pass-through configuration — src/http/app.ts:26 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials
- `src/mail/message.ts:135` · Hidden zero-width characters detected — src/mail/message.ts:135 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content

## Proposed change
The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account.

## How this will be verified
Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page.

_Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account:
gh repo fork cempack/facteur --clone && cd facteur
curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/facteur/1.0.0/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero
git checkout -b killerskills/1.0.0 && git commit -am "facteur: Hidden zero-width characters detected"
gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/glama/facteur/1.0.0/patch.md)

We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.