Skills/Glama/easee-mcp

easee-mcp@r1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables voice queries about an Easee car charger's charging status, current limit, recent sessions, and energy use, with strictly read-only access that cannot start, stop, or modify the charger." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher roykollensvendsen · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is easee-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:30 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: the workflow runs each of these; nesting them here would run the suite inside itselfFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/imperative.py:161 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentCONTRIBUTING.md:28 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: these are the gates; running them from inside a gate would recurseFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/setup.md:14 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it installs; the suite runs inside what it installsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/setup.md:68 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it needs claude-voice and this checkout's pathFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/setup.md:85 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it asks for the loginFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentCONTRIBUTING.md:44 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it reads the owner's own login, which no test may doFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentCONTRIBUTING.md:9 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: clones the repository the reader is already inFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentdocs/setup.md:102 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it asks for typed inputFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentCONTRIBUTING.md:115 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: whyFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutate.py:185 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentCONTRIBUTING.md:184 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentnot run: it is already on in this cloneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ratchet.py:311 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeshangs even so is ended by hand, with its whole group, by `kill -9 -- -<its pid>`. ItsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ratchet.py:315 · Python subprocess execution detectedstep = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_layers.py:21 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:196 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# turns colour back on, which would otherwise make every kill unattributable.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/private_data_scan.py:107 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True) # noqa: S603, S607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/easee_mcp/cli.py:123 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf" `chmod 700 {folder}` and log in again."Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutate.py:283 · Python subprocess execution detectedfound = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ratchet.py:329 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesf"Stopping {command[0]} and waiting for it; if it hangs: kill -9 -- -{step.pid}\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_login.py:140 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsassert "chmod 700" in errFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/bounded.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedwith subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/readable.py:76 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:360 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# A kill by some other test is not evidence about this rule.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/mutate.py:16 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesA kill is not enough on its own. A mutation breaks whatever it breaks, and itFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_layers.py:20 · Dynamic module loadingmodule = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,141 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim roykollensvendsen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim roykollensvendsenPropose a patch to the maintainer