Skills/Glama/consentry

consentry@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables any MCP-compatible agent to route its outbound tool calls and inbound tool responses through a boundary-enforced consent firewall that detects and minimizes sensitive fields per recipient, purpose and data type, pauses for user approval, quarantines prompt injections, and writes a tamper-evident privacy receipt for every decision. Sensitive values stay as vault tokens so the model provider never receives them unless policy explicitly allows it." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher vnmoorthy · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 4d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CONSENTRY_AGENT, CONSENTRY_AGENT_NAME, CONSENTRY_DATA_DIR, CONSENTRY_EFFORT, CONSENTRY_MODEL, CONSENTRY_URL, PPTX_APPLY_THEME, PRESET, VITE_FORCE_LOCAL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso open-meteo.com, weather.gov, usgs.gov, dot.gov, fda.gov, fema.gov, openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com, telemetry-cdn.io, tabletap-cdn.io, nhtsa.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names open-meteo.com, weather.gov, usgs.gov, dot.gov, fda.gov, fema.gov, openxmlformats.org, microsoft.com, telemetry-cdn.io, tabletap-cdn.io, nhtsa.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/server/src/index.ts:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = join(root, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedpackages/core/src/injection.ts:26 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content{ id: 'hidden-text', label: 'Hidden zero-width / invisible characters', re: /[​-‍⁠‪-‮]/, weight: 0.6, kind: 'hidden-text' },Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/web/src/pages/Settings.tsx:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…<span className="text-emerald-300">· configured ({s.keySource === 'env' ? 'from .env' : 'encrypted in vault store'})</span>}</label> <div className="f…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedpackages/core/src/injection.ts:68 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentexcerpt: truncate(excerpt.replace(/[​-‍⁠]/g, '').replace(/\s+/g, ' '), 320),Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/web/src/pages/Settings.tsx:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… : 'Stored encrypted on your gateway (AES-256-GCM). Or set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in .env.'}</p> </div> <div> <label className="mb-…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:212 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file<summary><b>Full gateway API</b></summary> | Method | Route | Purpose | |---|---|---| | `GET` | `/api/state` | Snapshot: masked vault, policies, recipients, tooFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/model-bench.ts:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor (const line of existsSync('.env') ? readFileSync('.env', 'utf8').split('\n') : []) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapps/server/src/index.ts:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Minimal .env loader (no dependency): KEY=value lines at the repo root.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Bidirectional text override characters detectedpackages/core/src/injection.ts:26 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction{ id: 'hidden-text', label: 'Hidden zero-width / invisible characters', re: /[​-‍⁠‪-‮]/, weight: 0.6, kind: 'hidden-text' },Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackages/core/src/llm.ts:96 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files….env?.CONSENTRY_DEBUG_LLM) { const u = response.usage ?? {}; console.log(`[claude] turn ${turn + 1} ${((Date.now() - t0) / 1000).toFixed(1)}s in=${u.input_tokens} cache_read=${u.cache_read_input_tokens ?? 0} cache_write=${u.cache_creation_…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/claude-check.ts:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.error('No ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in .env or the environment.');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Bidirectional text override characters detectedpackages/core/src/injection.ts:78 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction.replace(/[​-‍⁠‪-‮]/g, '');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/claude-check.ts:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor (const line of existsSync('.env') ? readFileSync('.env', 'utf8').split('\n') : []) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/set-key.sh:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 .envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/set-key.sh:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "✓ Saved to .env and the key works. Go back to the chat and say: done"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/video/timeline.ts:263 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Tightened pauses by ${tightened.toFixed(1)}s · speed ×${speed} · output ${duration.toFixed(1)}s (pre-roll ${PRE_ROLL}s) · ${keep.length} kept ranges`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/video/compose.ts:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`audio: ${m.input_i} LUFS → -14 LUFS`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/set-key.sh:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschmod 600 .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/video/graphics.ts:11 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconst FONT = '<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Work+Sans:wght@400;500;600&display=block" rel="stylesheet">';Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandapps/server/src/store.ts:9 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* the master key lives in .consentry/master.key (chmod 600) and never touches the database.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/set-key.sh:2 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# Saves your Anthropic API key to .env (gitignored, chmod 600) without echoing it, then checks it works.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/set-key.sh:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "Saved to .env, but Anthropic answered HTTP $code. Double-check the key, then run this again."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/set-key.sh:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Saves your Anthropic API key to .env (gitignored, chmod 600) without echoing it, then checks it works.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/set-key.sh:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files} > .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/video/thumbnail.ts:53 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`→ ${OUTPUT}/consentry-demo-thumbnail.png`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/video/captions.ts:23 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking`<!doctype html><html><head><link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Work+Sans:wght@500;600&display=block" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionapps/server/src/index.ts:126 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesapp.post('/api/requests/:id/send', async (c) => c.json(await rt.sendRequest(c.req.param('id'))));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/video/transcribe.py:15 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-v", "error", "-y", "-i", src, "-vn", "-ac", "1", "-ar", "16000", wav], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)apps/web/src/pages/Connections.tsx:151 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkcode={JSON.stringify({ mcpServers: { consentry: { command: 'npx', args: ['tsx', '/path/to/consentry/apps/mcp/src/index.ts'], env: { CONSENTRY_URL: 'http://localhost:8787' } } } }, null, 2)}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/video/thumbnail.ts:29 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking`<!doctype html><html><head><link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Work+Sans:wght@500;700;800&display=block" rel="stylesheet"><style>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackages/core/src/llm.ts:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif ((globalThis as any).process?.env?.CONSENTRY_DEBUG_LLM) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈34 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vnmoorthy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vnmoorthyPropose a patch to the maintainer