Skills/Glama/bnbloc-mysql

bnbloc-mysql@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an agent to query connected MySQL databases through named aliases, running reads immediately while holding data-changing statements for local user approval. Passwords are entered on the user's own computer and never reach the agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher luckylhb90 · publishing for 10 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 10d ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialspage.go:145 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringhttp.Error(w, "type the password, or Cancel", http.StatusBadRequest)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddb.go:199 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// kill stops a statement on the server from a second connection of its own:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialstools.go:203 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringreturn s.answer(s.cfg.Pending.ToAgent(id) + " They will type the password there; you never see it. Then use action \"test\".")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsclassify_test.go:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"LOAD DATA INFILE '/etc/passwd' INTO TABLE t",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsclassify_test.go:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"load_file reads the server's disk": "SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd')",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim luckylhb90: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim luckylhb90Propose a patch to the maintainer