testkube@r8

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "The Testkube MCP Server exposes continuous testing capabilities (test orchestration, execution, troubleshooting and anlysis) to AI tools and workflows " Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher kubeshop · publishing for 135 daysInstalls 34,939Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 13 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TK_ACCESS_TOKENTK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GITLEAKS_IGNORE_PATHS, TESTKUBE_API_URI, TK_CONTROL_PLANE_URL, TK_DASHBOARD_URL, TK_ENV_ID, TK_MCP_ENV_MODE, TK_ORG_ID
Where it talks to
testkube.io (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, bit.ly — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, bit.ly as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TK_ACCESS_TOKEN, TK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to testkube.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TK_ACCESS_TOKEN=testkube.io,TK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKEN=testkube.io -- docker run -i --rm mcp/testkube

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is testkube@r8 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.0sprocessexited 2:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/diff
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 1: [ERROR] docker is not installed, and swagger-codegen 3.0.78 is not on the PATH
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.2sprocessexited 128: fatal: not a git repository (or any of the parent directories): .git
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.3sprocessexited 1: cp: cannot stat '/tmp/ks-detonate-HTegQM/scripts/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/testkube/k8s/helm/testkube-crds': No such file or directory
0.3sprocess8 of 13 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagejs/package.json:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…:preview": "export NODE_OPTIONS=--max_old_space_size=4096 && turbo run build && npx import-meta-env --disposable --env packages/web/.env.preview -x packages/web/.env.example --pat…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsjs/package.json:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…=4096 && turbo run build && npx import-meta-env --disposable --env packages/web/.env.preview -x packages/web/.env.example --path packages/web/dist/index.html", …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:239 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…playConfiguration(configData, "default") // Start the MCP server return startMCPServer(common.ResolveSkipTLS(cmd, &cfg), accessToken, cfg.CloudContext.OrganizationId, cfg.CloudContext.EnvironmentId, cfg.CloudContext.ApiUri, cfg.CloudContex…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:242 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…t, shttpPort, shttpTLS, shttpCertFile, shttpKeyFile, "cli-direct") } func startMCPServer(skipTLS bool, accessToken, orgID, envID, baseURL, dashboardURL string, debug bool, transport, shttpHost string, shttpPort int, shttpTLS bool, shttpCer…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:65 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedPlease get in touch on Slack for questions and feedback: https://bit.ly/testkube-slackFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:194 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkreturn startMCPServer(common.ResolveSkipTLS(cmd, nil), accessToken, orgID, envID, baseURL, dashboardURL, debug, transport, shttpHost, shttpPort, shttpTLS, shttpCertFile, shttpKeyFile, "cli-env")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:30 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedWe welcome feedback on Slack: https://bit.ly/testkube-slackFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:139 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Feedback welcome: https://bit.ly/testkube-slack\n")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/generate-openapi.sh:48 · Destructive file system command detecteddocker run --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kubeshop: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. URL shortener detected≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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