Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/testkube

testkube@r7

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "The Testkube MCP Server exposes continuous testing capabilities (test orchestration, execution, troubleshooting and anlysis) to AI tools and workflows " Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher kubeshop · publishing for 129 daysInstalls 34,760Last detonated 4 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TK_ACCESS_TOKENTK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: GITLEAKS_IGNORE_PATHS, TESTKUBE_API_URI, TK_CONTROL_PLANE_URL, TK_DASHBOARD_URL, TK_ENV_ID, TK_MCP_ENV_MODE, TK_ORG_ID
Where it talks to
testkube.io (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, bit.ly — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, bit.ly as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TK_ACCESS_TOKEN, TK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to testkube.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets TK_ACCESS_TOKEN=testkube.io,TK_MCP_SHTTP_AUTH_TOKEN=testkube.io -- docker run -i --rm mcp/testkube

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is testkube@r7 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:242 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…t, shttpPort, shttpTLS, shttpCertFile, shttpKeyFile, "cli-direct") } func startMCPServer(skipTLS bool, accessToken, orgID, envID, baseURL, dashboardURL string, debug bool, transport, shttpHost string, shttpPort int, shttpTLS bool, shttpCer…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:30 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedWe welcome feedback on Slack: https://bit.ly/testkube-slackFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:65 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedPlease get in touch on Slack for questions and feedback: https://bit.ly/testkube-slackFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsjs/package.json:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…=4096 && turbo run build && npx import-meta-env --disposable --env packages/web/.env.preview -x packages/web/.env.example --path packages/web/dist/index.html", …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:194 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkreturn startMCPServer(common.ResolveSkipTLS(cmd, nil), accessToken, orgID, envID, baseURL, dashboardURL, debug, transport, shttpHost, shttpPort, shttpTLS, shttpCertFile, shttpKeyFile, "cli-env")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedcmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:139 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verifiedfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "Feedback welcome: https://bit.ly/testkube-slack\n")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagejs/package.json:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…:preview": "export NODE_OPTIONS=--max_old_space_size=4096 && turbo run build && npx import-meta-env --disposable --env packages/web/.env.preview -x packages/web/.env.example --pat…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/kubectl-testkube/commands/mcp.go:239 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…playConfiguration(configData, "default") // Start the MCP server return startMCPServer(common.ResolveSkipTLS(cmd, &cfg), accessToken, cfg.CloudContext.OrganizationId, cfg.CloudContext.EnvironmentId, cfg.CloudContext.ApiUri, cfg.CloudContex…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/generate-openapi.sh:48 · Destructive file system command detecteddocker run --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kubeshop: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. URL shortener detected≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Docker MCP Catalog, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim kubeshopPropose a patch to the maintainer