render@r12

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Interact with your Render resources via LLMs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher render-oss · publishing for 133 daysInstalls 17,044Last detonated 49 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENAI_VERIFICATION_TOKENRENDER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LOGGING, REDIS_URL, RENDER_HOST, TOOL_CALL_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
render.com (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, mcp.ex — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, mcp.ex as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_VERIFICATION_TOKEN, RENDER_API_KEY only into requests to render.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets OPENAI_VERIFICATION_TOKEN=render.com,RENDER_API_KEY=render.com -- docker run -i --rm mcp/render

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is render@r12 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: Error: unzip is required but not installed
0.0sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/server.go:171 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkreturn mcpServer, httpTransportFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandbin/install.sh:86 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${INSTALL_DIR}/render-mcp-server"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/httpcontext_test.go:52 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, session.NewInMemoryStore())Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/server.go:68 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, sessionStore)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpkg/config/config.go:168 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// Ignore the error if we can't chmod try to continueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbin/install.sh:4 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLbin/install.sh:4 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)pkg/client/client.go:14 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/httpcontext_test.go:10 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/server_test.go:117 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, session.NewInMemoryStore())Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/server.go:23 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbin/install.sh:4 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cmd/server.go:149 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfunc newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient *client.ClientWithResponses, sessionStore session.Store) (*server.MCPServer, *server.StreamableHTTPServer) {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpkg/config/config.go:199 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions// Ignore the error if we can't chmod try to continueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈34 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim render-oss: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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