render@r11
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Interact with your Render resources via LLMs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENAI_VERIFICATION_TOKENRENDER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LOGGING, REDIS_URL, RENDER_HOST, TOOL_CALL_LOG_LEVEL- Where it talks to
- render.com (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, mcp.ex — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, mcp.ex as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENAI_VERIFICATION_TOKEN, RENDER_API_KEY only into requests to render.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is render@r11 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.mcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, sessionStore)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.chmod +x "${INSTALL_DIR}/render-mcp-server"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, session.NewInMemoryStore())Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/refs/heads/main/bin/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return mcpServer, httpTransportFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.mcpServer, httpTransport := newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient, session.NewInMemoryStore())Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them."github.com/render-oss/render-mcp-server/pkg/httpcontext"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.func newStreamableHTTPServer(apiClient *client.ClientWithResponses, sessionStore session.Store) (*server.MCPServer, *server.StreamableHTTPServer) {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.// Ignore the error if we can't chmod try to continueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// Ignore the error if we can't chmod try to continueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim render-oss: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.