neo4j@r6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Official MCP server for Neo4j. Interact with Neo4j using Cypher graph queries." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher neo4j · publishing for 250 daysInstalls 188KLast detonated 8d ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/neo4j
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try neo4j` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is neo4j@r6 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv: [".env.task"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv: [".env.task"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv: [".env.task"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv: [".env.task"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:616 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmux.Handle("/", s.chainMiddleware(allowedOrigins, mcpServerHTTP))Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:600 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServerHTTP := mcp.NewStreamableHTTPHandler(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/scripts/smoke-test-wheel.sh:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$BIN"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:585 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfunc (s *Neo4jMCPServer) StartHTTPServer() error {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/middleware.go:31 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfunc (s *Neo4jMCPServer) chainMiddleware(allowedOrigins []string, next http.Handler) http.Handler {Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈29 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.