neo4j@r3
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Official MCP server for Neo4j. Interact with Neo4j using Cypher graph queries." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is neo4j@r3 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-02 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/changie.yml:38 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/scripts/smoke-test-wheel.sh:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:18 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/changie.yml:23 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:17 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/changie.yml:22 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/release.yml:19 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/middleware.go:31 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressinternal/logger/logger_test.go:175 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/changie.yml:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressinternal/logger/logger_test.go:176 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressinternal/logger/logger_test.go:176 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/changie.yml:24 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressinternal/logger/logger_test.go:175 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsTaskfile.yml:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:600 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server_test.go:46 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:585 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server_test.go:63 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server_test.go:160 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server.go:616 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server_test.go:135 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/server/server_test.go:116 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04What would make this Verified
15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim neo4j: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to Docker MCP Catalog, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim neo4j