Skills/ClawHub/web-checker

web-checker@1.0.3

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Low-volume web configuration auditor with JS-bundle security analysis: probes headers, DNS, TLS, config exposure, and client-side XSS/secrets. Zero runtime dependencies." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher z-hussein · publishing for 69 daysInstalls 109Last detonated 3 h ago
$clawhub install web-checker
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 16 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 1.0.2

vet-skills diff web-checker 1.0.2 1.0.3

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.5sprocess8 of 16 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/sensitive_paths.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(".env", "Env vars (real secrets)", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/sensitive_paths.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(".env.local", "Local env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:47 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `sensitive_paths` | Probes 15 paths (.env, .git/, admin panels) via HTTP | ✅ Yes (active probing) |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/sensitive_paths.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(".env.production", "Production env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/sensitive_paths.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Sensitive-path probe - .env, .git, config files, admin paths.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/sensitive_paths.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The file names below (`.env`, `.git/config` etc.) describe whatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/tls.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandrecon-cli/recon_cli/cli.py:142 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - one check must not kill the runFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/dns.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed coderecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/js_bundle.py:44 · Python exec or eval of computed code("eval()", r"\beval\s*\("),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/tls.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrecon-cli/recon_cli/checks/tls.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrecon-cli/recon_cli/http.py:41 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,536 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.