web-checker@1.0.5
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Low-volume web configuration auditor with JS-bundle security analysis: probes headers, DNS, TLS, config exposure, and client-side XSS/secrets. Zero runtime dependencies." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 16 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 1.0.3
vet-skills diff web-checker 1.0.3 1.0.5This version reaches for something 1.0.3 did not: 1 new host (target.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- target.com
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
| `sensitive_paths` | Probes 15 paths (.env, .git/, admin panels) via HTTP | ✅ Yes (active probing) |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("eval()", r"\beval\s*\("),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.(".env", "Env vars (real secrets)", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Sensitive-path probe - .env, .git, config files, admin paths.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# against the *remote server* (e.g. https://target.com/.env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(".env.local", "Local env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(".env.production", "Production env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# against the *remote server* (e.g. https://target.com/.env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(".env.local", "Local env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Sensitive-path probe - .env, .git, config files, admin paths.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(".env", "Env vars (real secrets)", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("eval()", r"\beval\s*\("),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.(".env.production", "Production env", Severity.CRIT),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - one check must not kill the runFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 - one check must not kill the runFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.