Skills/ClawHub/watchclaw

watchclaw@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Auto-recovery watchdog for OpenClaw gateway. Monitors health, detects bad config changes, and recovers via git stash/revert. Supports native and Docker resta..." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jarvis4wang · publishing for 266 daysInstalls 1,220Last detonated 37 min ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:2 · Remote installer piped to shell# watchclaw installer — curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:18 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/$f"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:15 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source"command": "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bash",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:2 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# watchclaw installer — curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:2 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# watchclaw installer — curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"command": "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:15 · Remote installer piped to shell"command": "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jarvis4wang/watchclaw/main/install.sh | bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈688 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jarvis4wang: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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