story-long-write@1.2.8
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "长篇网文规划与写作。支持只讨论结构、只写大纲或指定细纲，明确要求正文后再写章节。触发方式：/story-long-write、/写长篇、「帮我开书」「定设定」「出卷纲」「规划剧情」「写大纲」「补细纲」「日更」「续写」「继续写」「修改第X章」「回炉」「重写第X章」。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
lines = text.lstrip("").split("\n")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read().lstrip("")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.subprocess.run([node, str(script), str(body)], text=True, encoding="utf-8",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return { ok: true, text: fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8').replace(/^/, '') }Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(HERE / "outline_view.py"), "--check", str(path)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.const text = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').replace(/^/, '')Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").lstrip("")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.completed = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim worldwonderer: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.