story-long-write@1.2.6
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "长篇网文规划与写作。支持只讨论结构、只写大纲或指定细纲，明确要求正文后再写章节。触发方式：/story-long-write、/写长篇、「帮我开书」「定设定」「出卷纲」「规划剧情」「写大纲」「补细纲」「日更」「续写」「继续写」「修改第X章」「回炉」「重写第X章」。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run([node, str(script), str(body)], text=True, encoding="utf-8",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, str(HERE / "outline_view.py"), "--check", str(path)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return { ok: true, text: fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8').replace(/^/, '') }Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return io.open(path, encoding="utf-8").read().lstrip("")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").lstrip("")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.completed = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.lines = text.lstrip("").split("\n")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.const text = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').replace(/^/, '')Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.