Skills/ClawHub/skill-doctor-audit

skill-doctor-audit@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Audit, debug, and clean up the OpenClaw skills you already have installed. Use this skill whenever the user asks to check, audit, review, clean up, or debug..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher chris · publishing for 443 daysInstalls 753Last detonated 3 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Reads credential paths from the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:51 · Reads credential paths from the home directory…, environment variables posted to a URL, hard-coded `ghp_`/`sk-`/`AKIA` tokens, reads of `~/.ssh`/`.aws/credentials`, reverse-shell patterns, `rm -rf /`) deserves a clear, calm…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagCHANGELOG.md:14 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file- `which "<prompt>"` command: predicts which installed skill will fire for a prompt and warns when the choice is ambiguous.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskill_doctor.py:327 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskill_doctor.py:241 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(re.compile(r"(?:id_rsa|\.ssh/|\.aws/credentials|\.npmrc|\.netrc)"), "high",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:51 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions… line before trusting the skill. A `medium` flag (`shell=True`, `eval`/`exec`, `chmod 777`) is worth a look but often legitimate. Always cite the file and line and sh…Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellevals/evals.json:12 · Remote installer piped to shell{"text": "Identifies at least one concrete red flag (curl|bash, hard-coded token, or env-var exfiltration)", "kind": "qualitative"},Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…ent variables posted to a URL, hard-coded `ghp_`/`sk-`/`AKIA` tokens, reads of `~/.ssh`/`.aws/credentials`, reverse-shell patterns, `rm -rf /`) deserves a clear, calm…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:51 · Destructive file system command detected…`/`AKIA` tokens, reads of `~/.ssh`/`.aws/credentials`, reverse-shell patterns, `rm -rf /`) deserves a clear, calm warning and a recommendation to review the exact file …Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,670 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chris: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chrisPropose a patch to the maintainer